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CULTURAL CHANGE PROCESSES IN MERGERS 
A social constructionist perspective 
Short title: 
Cultural Change Processes in Mergers 
 
Summary 
There have been a number of attempts to explain post-merger problems by 
cultural differences, and in this paper, we argue that much previous research on 
mergers is based on an essentialist concept of culture. We claim that this 
conception is a problematic starting point for cultural studies, and argue for a 
social constructionist alternative. The conceptual challenges we address are: 
decontextualization of cultural issues, cultural differentiation and 
fragmentation, and structural versus processual views on culture. We also 
outline an agenda for future merger research and argue for studies focusing on 
cultural sensemaking processes in merging organizations by adopting narrative 
perspectives. 
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Introduction 
Mergers1 have become a major strategic tool of multinational corporations and 
their preferred mode of organizational growth and internationalization. During 
a period of 6 years the worldwide mergers activity has risen to new records. 
According to KPMG Corporate Finance’s Dealwatch 1999, the total value of 
cross-border transactions has been multiplied with four from 196,4 billion 
USD in 1994 to 798 billion USD in 1999. The main motives behind these 
strategic alliances are usually related to improved performance and creation of 
higher value. However, empirical studies applying different performance 
measures consistently report that nearly half of all mergers lead to 
disappointments or outright failures; even merged companies with a fairly 
good financial performance must sometimes confront severe internal problems 
in the implementation phase. This has created a need to explain experienced 
difficulties, and to this end, many researchers, management consultants and 
practitioners have drawn attention to cultural dimensions of organizational 
change processes in mergers (see e.g. Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Morosini, 1998). 
Drawing on the literature on organizational cultures, researchers have 
conceptualized post-merger change processes as cultural integration processes 
and attempted to explain problems and failures by cultural differences (see e.g. 
Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Datta, 1991; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Weber & 
                                                 
1   The term "merger" has two slightly different meanings: Firstly, it may refer to a combination of 
organizations where neither partner is dominant and where both partners are secured an (at least in 
principle) equal influence on decision making. Secondly, it may refer to any kind of combination of 
organizations, regardless of the contractual arrangement. Here, we use the term "merger" in the 
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Schweiger, 1992; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Weber, 1996). In these studies, 
cultures (usually understood as shared assumptions and values) have been 
found to be quite change resistant. Therefore, it is assumed that they may cause 
organizational problems in case of incompatibilities. In the study of cross-
border mergers, national cultural differences have been given particular 
attention (Olie, 1994; Calori et al., 1994; Very et al., 1997; Gertsen & 
Soederberg, 1998b, 1998c; Gertsen et al., 1998a, 1998b; Vaara, 1999a, 1999b). 
It has been argued that persistent national cultural differences make integration 
processes in cross-border mergers more difficult than in domestic mergers. 
This is the case because it can be complicated to work with people who have 
been socialized into different beliefs and values (see e.g. Very et al., 1997). 
Not only researchers but also the managers and employees involved in mergers 
have pointed to national and organizational cultural differences as major 
causes of integration problems. In fact, culture has become an integral part of 
the general discussion on mergers, and thus a core element of the social 
construction of the phenomenon. 
We argue in this article that there is a need for critical reflection on the impact 
attributed to culture in the merger context. The purpose of this article is to 
discuss some of the theoretical and methodological problems in studies of 
culture in post-merger organizational change processes and to present and 
elaborate an alternative approach for future research based on a social 
constructionist conception of culture. Our argumentation is based on 
theoretical reflections from a social constructionist point of departure.  
                                                                                                                                               
second, more general sense, which also includes acquisitions. 
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In the first section of this article, we argue that most previous research on 
mergers is based on an essentialist concept of culture. In the next section, we 
elaborate the social constructionist alternative. We then take up specific 
conceptual challenges in cultural research on mergers in the third section. 
These are decontextualization of cultural issues, cultural differentiation and 
fragmentation, and systemic versus processual views on culture. In the fourth 
section, we outline an agenda for future research. We argue for studies 
focusing on cultural sensemaking processes, and specifically suggest adopting 
narrative perspectives on merger discourses. 
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The essentialist conception of culture  
While there are a few earlier attempts to study organizations from a cultural 
perspective, more widespread interest in the cultural perspective did not 
emerge until the early 1980s when both national (see e.g. Hofstede, 1984) and 
organizational (see e.g. Pettigrew, 1979) level considerations started to interest 
organization and management scholars. This development was reflected in 
both more theoretically (Pettigrew, 1979; Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985) and more 
practically (Peters & Waterman, 1982; Deal & Kennedy, 1985) oriented 
research efforts. Since then there has been an ongoing debate in organization 
studies concerning the epistemological, methodological, theoretical and even 
ideological foundations of research in organizational culture (see Martin and 
Frost, 1996).2 Consequently, there are many perspectives on and definitions of 
organizational culture, ranging from more essentialist (Schein, 1985) to more 
constructionist views (Hatch, 1993; Christensen & Kreiner, 1984; Kreiner & 
Schultz, 1995; Willmott & Knights, 1995). 
Some earlier studies pointed to the significance of the period following the 
initial merger or acquisition (Davis, 1968; Kitching, 1967, 1974; Levinson, 
1970), but the discussion concerning organizational change processes 
following mergers and acquisitions did not really start until the mid-1980s. 
Most of this research concentrated on strategic questions such as which 
                                                 
2  There are a number of excellent reviews of this literature such as Pettigrew (1979), Ouchi & Wilkins 
(1985), Barley et al. (1988), Turner (1990), Kunda (1991), Alvesson & Berg (1992), Czarniawska-
Joerges (1992), Linstead & Grafton-Small (1992), Martin (1992), Hatch (1993), Trice & Beyer 
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acquisition choices are likely to lead to success (Salter & Weinhold, 1979; 
Kusewitt, 1985; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989), or what types of mergers and 
acquisitions (related or unrelated) lead to better results in terms of synergy or 
financial performance (see Lubatkin, 1987; Chatterjee, 1986; Porter, 1987; 
Singh and Montgomery, 1987; Shelton, 1988; Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; 
Seth, 1990). But eventually, more and more scholars became interested in 
integration issues (see e.g. Shrivastava, 1986). There was an increased focus 
on questions such as how the management can bring about the expected or 
other potential synergistic benefits from joining previously separate 
organizations (Lindgren, 1982; Larsson, 1990), create value (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991), transfer capabilities from one organization to another 
(Laamanen, 1997) or enhance learning (Leroy & Ramanantsoa, 1997). 
Motivated by general interest in the "soft aspects" of mergers and acquisitions, 
other scholars adopted a human resource oriented perspective and concentrated 
on organizational responses to mergers and acquisitions (Schweiger et al., 
1987; Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Napier et al., 1989; Schweiger & DeNisi, 
1991; Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Greenwood et 
al., 1994; Fried et al., 1996; Lohrum, 1996). These latter studies demonstrated 
the need to take human resource issues into consideration in the strategic 
planning of mergers. 
When organizational scholars discovered "culture" as a convenient metaphor 
for various types of organizational phenomena, researchers started to analyze 
organizational change processes following mergers and acquisitions from a 
cultural perspective. This literature concentrated on the organizational cultural 
                                                                                                                                               
(1993), Willmott (1993), Harris (1994), Schultz (1994), Martin & Frost (1996). 
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integration processes and sought explanations for post-merger problems in 
terms of "cultural clashes" (Davis, 1968; Sales & Mirvis, 1984; Marks & 
Mirvis, 1986; Buono, Bowditch & Lewis, 1985; Walter, 1985; Altendorf, 
1986; Datta, 1991; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Weber & Schweiger, 1992; 
Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Larsson, 1993; Elsass & Veiga, 1994; Weber, 
1996). In international settings, researchers have focused not only on 
organizational, but also on national cultural differences (Olie, 1994; Calori, 
Lubatkin & Very, 1994; Morosini & Singh, 1994; Villinger, 1996; Weber, 
Shenkar & Raveh, 1996; Very et al., 1997; Gertsen et al., 1998a).  
Our point here is that most of the studies in this area adhere to an essentialist 
concept of culture which developed within Western anthropology of the 1950s 
and 1960s. According to this concept of culture, culture is seen as an empirical 
category, a relatively stable, homogeneous, internally consistent system of 
assumptions, values, and norms, which can be objectively described (cf. 
Hastrup, 1995); something that members of a group, an organization, or a 
nation have or bear collectively. The reasoning is that, by analysis, it is 
possible to reach the core (the basic assumptions and values) of any culture by 
surveying and systematizing the behavior and stated attitudes of individual 
members. In this way it is possible to present cultures as objectively 
identifiable and well-defined entities which may be compared. This classic 
concept of culture forms the theoretical basis of most comparative 
management research (e.g. Hofstede, 1991) and has also inspired a 
considerable part of the research in organizational cultures (e.g. Schein, 1985). 
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In line with the essentialist conception, most cultural research on mergers see 
integration problems as being caused by these objective cultural differences. In 
international settings, drawing on Hofstede’s (1991) and Trompenaars’ (1993) 
work, this has resulted in research arguing that mergers between culturally 
closer nations lead to better outcomes than those between more distant national 
cultures (see Morosini & Singh, 1994). The contrary argument that cultural 
differences may also be a source of value has received little attention until 
recent studies. Krishnan, Miller & Judge (1997) have, however, illustrated how 
cultural diversity can benefit top management decision making.  
Reflecting the essentialist conception, most researchers in this field share an 
ambition to find out which organizational cultures can co-exist and how. 
According to the "cultural fit" or "cultural compatibility" perspective 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; Larsson, 1993), the most problematic situations 
are those where the beliefs and values of the organizational members are 
contradictory. According to this view, beliefs and values that do not conflict 
are not likely to create particular problems. Others, like Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh (1988), Morosini & Singh (1994) and Calori, Lubatkin & Very 
(1994), have also developed the argument that the adopted integration 
strategies should be "culturally compatible". 
The concept of acculturation is central to the study of contacts between 
different cultures and is therefore of interest in this context. Berry (1980, 1983, 
1984) elaborated the classic anthropological concept of acculturation. He has 
defined acculturation as "changes induced in (two cultural) systems as a result 
of the diffusion of cultural elements in both directions" (Berry, 1980, p. 215). 
  8 
 
This means that whenever individuals from two cultures come together, for 
example by working together in a merged company, a change takes place 
whereby individuals adapt or react to the other culture. This process can take 
the form of "assimilation", "integration", "rejection", or "deculturation". 
"Assimilation" means replacing one's culture with the new culture, 
"deculturation" giving up one’s culture without adopting the new culture, 
"separation" maintaining one’s own culture with rejection of the other culture, 
and "integration" maintaining parts of one’s own culture while moving towards 
the new culture. 
Drawing on Berry’s studies (1980), Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988) 
described a model where post-merger acculturation may likewise proceed in 
four different ways: assimilation, integration, separation and deculturation. 
Central to this model is on the one hand the actors’ willingness to preserve 
their own culture and on the other hand their perception of the attractiveness of 
the other culture. This model has become a corner stone in the cultural 
literature on mergers and acquisitions. For example, Elsass & Veiga (1994) 
have later further elaborated these ideas and illustrated how the acculturation 
processes are affected by organizational performance. 
Researchers in this field also mostly share a normative goal - to advance 
general action instructions that may minimize problems in mergers and 
promote more effective managerial action. Though different models are 
proposed, and somewhat different conclusions reached, researchers within this 
approach have generally assumed that cultural analyses of the companies 
involved carried out before the merger will make it possible to predict 
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problems of integration and adjust the management's integration strategy 
accordingly. 
However, the essentialist concept of culture has been increasingly criticized 
within the field of anthropology in which it originated (see for example 
Hannerz, 1996). Many anthropologists now query the essentialist ways of 
thinking. This leads to a social constructionist conception of culture, which 
will be elaborated in the following section. 
 
A social constructionist perspective on cultural change processes 
In the last 15-20 years, several variants of social constructionism have 
appeared. In the following presentation of key themes in social 
constructionism, variations in researchers’ agendas are deliberately 
downplayed and similarities highlighted. We will not go deeply into 
discussions of philosophical statements, but instead look at how social 
constructionism can be employed in empirical research. Furthermore we will 
focus on how social constructionism offers a theoretical basis for critical 
discussion of mainstream research approaches to cultural change processes in 
mergers. 
In their seminal work The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (1966), the sociologists Berger and Luckmann start 
with two claims: reality is socially constructed, and processes of social 
construction should be the focus of a sociology of knowledge. Everything 
belonging to a culture, including science and technology, presupposes human 
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beings, a human language and human actions. Berger and Luckmann make a 
distinction between society as subjective reality including people’s beliefs 
about the world, and the material world or, as they express it, "that world 
which cannot be wished away". Social objects are by their nature meaningful, 
whereas material objects are only meaningful when they are incorporated into 
the social. However, we have no direct access to any reality, neither the 
material nor the social. Access is always mediated through our use of 
language.  
Social constructionism rests on a number of key premises (see for example 
Gergen, 1999): 
• Subjective and social realities are constructed in societal and cultural 
processes which are culturally and historically limited. 
• Discourse (language in texts and talk - e.g. narrative - and other forms 
of representation) plays a central role in social construction processes. 
Our understanding of the world is created and maintained in social 
interaction, in ongoing negotiations about what should be held as either 
true or false.   
• Social construction processes (e.g. description, explanation) are 
performed in a context of relationships. Meanings are born of 
agreements, negotiations, affirmations among persons. 
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• The ways we understand our world, and the representations of the 
world that we create, are historically and culturally specific and 
contingent.3  
• The outcome of the social constructions is communicated in narratives. 
Cultural identities and world views are expressed in narratives about 
how we interpret ourselves and phenomena in the subjective and the 
objective reality. 
• Different and competing scientific descriptions, accounts and theories 
of our internal and external reality are also historically and culturally 
situated narratives. They are neither true nor false framings of reality, 
but they may favor some perspectives and suppress others and likewise 
give voice to some groups and silence other. Moreover they can be 
viewed as an outcome of negotiations aiming at consensus within a 
specific scientific community.  
In the following sections, we will look at the implications of these premises for 
the understanding of cultures and identities in organizations.  
Each person's social reality is built up of cultural constructions, meanings and 
interpretations that are kept in place by negotiation and mutual consent. 
Cultural patterns are thus results of social, discursive processes, understood as 
ongoing negotiations that constantly create, uphold and transform perceptions 
of reality. Nevertheless cultural patterns may become internalized and thus 
                                                 
3  Even though in principle our knowledge and our social identities are contingent, they tend to be rather 
stable, because social situations always include ramifications of our potential identities as well as 
contextual boundaries, so that not every statement about the internal or external reality will be 
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appear as stable and "objective". But cultural meanings are per se contingent 
and contextual. Therefore, for example, an organizational culture may well be 
fragmented and change according to circumstances. Since cultural patterns of 
interpretation are produced, reproduced, and continually changed by the people 
identifying with them also people’s affiliation to national and organizational 
cultures, as well as to other cultural communities, are subject to change, and 
boundaries between cultures thus become fluid. 
It is in our discursive interactions that we constitute our social reality, 
including our knowledge, our identities and our social relations, and thereby 
maintain certain social patterns and cultures. Discursive changes are thus one 
way to change the social reality. This implies that language is not viewed 
merely as a kind of channel or conduit through which information is 
transmitted, such as it is often assumed in the dominant process models of 
communication (for a critique, see Putnam et al., 1996). On the contrary 
language and discursive action constitute the social world, our social identities 
and our social relations. 
This view on discursive practices is anti-essentialist: since social reality is 
socially and discursively constructed, it can neither be viewed as simply 
determined by external factors nor as something natural and given. 
Accordingly, social identities and cultures have no internal essence; they are 
not "genuine" or "authentic", but rather negotiated and contingent.  
Social constructionism does not prescribe a particular methodology for the 
study of cultural change processes. Culture as understood by social 
                                                                                                                                               
accepted as meaningful.  
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constructionists defies quantification, but the perspective is open to several 
different qualitative approaches, many of which are developed through 
anthropological fieldwork. Ethnographic case studies based on participant 
observation, qualitative interviews and collection of documents and aiming at 
"thick description" (Geertz, 1973) or "tales of the field" (van Maanen, 1988) 
are the preferred methodologies within this paradigm.  
 
A case study on cultural change processes 
Mergers and acquisitions lend themselves to a social constructionist approach. 
To date, however, there are only few examples of studies adopting such a 
perspective on post-merger cultural change processes. Kleppestø (1998) 
studied the construction of organizational cultures and social identities in a 
Swedish merger case. He specifically concentrated on the relationships 
between the representatives of the two companies as they negotiate their 
identities. Vaara (1999a) investigated organizational actors’ cultural 
sensemaking processes in a Finnish-Swedish context and concluded that 
cultural conceptions are formed in complex sensemaking processes.   
The telecommunications sector is for the moment the dominant line of business 
when it comes to cross-border mergers activity, both in the number of deals 
and the value of them. Gertsen and Soederberg have studied post-merger 
integration processes in 7 Danish telecommunications companies acquired by 
major foreign concerns (see also Gertsen & Soederberg, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 
1999, 2000).  Gertsen and Soederberg’s focus has been on the role of 
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communication in managers’ and employees’ cultural identification processes 
at a national and an organizational level. Gertsen and Soederberg have carried 
out fieldwork every year in the period 1994-2000. They collected what was 
written about the company in newspapers as well as other written material: 
annual accounts, web-sites and the like.  But their main access to the events 
and actions taking place in the merged company were interviews not only with 
the top management, but also with a large number of employees on different 
levels. They included unskilled workers, shop foremen, secretaries, R&D 
engineers, accountants, human resource managers, and sales people. Gertsen 
and Soederberg also interviewed representatives of trade unions and local trade 
councils as well as the director of the regional science-park to get an 
impression of the company's interaction with the local environment before and 
after the international mergers. Their perspective has mainly been that of the 
Danish merger partner, but expatriate managers sent to Denmark by their head 
offices were also interviewed. Most of the interviews were narrative in nature; 
i.e. they encouraged their interviewees to describe their situation at the 
workplace in their own words with as few interruptions from the interviewer as 
possible. These organizational narratives were not interpreted as accurate 
reports of actual events. They were rather seen as tales about various actions 
and events that sre given a certain meaning by the organizational actors as part 
of the plots they are continually constructing and revising in order to make 
sense of their experiences.  
The following empirical examples which will be used to illustrate the 
conceptual challenges related to cultural change processes are all taken from 
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Gertsen and Soederberg’s longitudional case study of Dancall, a Danish 
telecommunications company that develops and produces mobile phones. This 
company was first acquired by the British concern, Amstrad, in 1993, and then, 
in 1997, by the German multinational Robert Bosch GmbH..  
The company, which was originally called Dancall Radio, is situated in a small 
community in Northern Denmark. It was founded in 1980 by a small group of 
Danish engineers and expanded from 44 employees in 1981 to 870 employees 
in 1990. Management of the growing company was characterized by an R&D-
focused entrepreneurial spirit and a consensus-oriented decision-making style. 
In the late ´80s the growth of the cellular mobile phone industry and the 
intensive price wars made it dificult for smaller companies like Dancall Radio 
to keep pace with the giants, L.M. Ericsson, Motorola and Nokia. 
Nevertheless, the management of Dancall Radio knew that a new pan-
European telecommunication standard, the GSM system, was to be established 
in 1992. They were aware that products developed for the GSM system would 
give access to a huge European market. Therefore they decided to develop a 
GSM phone together with Cetelco, another local developer and producer of 
mobile phones. This joint development project, which was carried out in the 
regional science park was technologically successful, but it proved extremely 
costly. 
In 1993, after several years with severe financial difficulties, the company 
could not meet its financial obligations and had to suspend its payments. The 
British consumer electronics company Amstrad, whose owner wanted to 
diversify and had for some time been planning to enter the expanding 
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telecommunications market, decided to buy Dancall and sent a British 
managing director and a couple of other managers from their headquarters to 
Denmark. The British managers claimed that marketing and sales were 
relatively weak points in the Danish company, and the new management made 
great efforts both to redefine the company's commercial strategy and to enter 
into long-term contracts with telecommunication network operators on the 
European market. Extensive plans were made for mass production and the 
building of a new high volume factory, but it turned out to be harder than 
expected to make profits, and the plans were postponed. 
In 1997, after almost four years under British ownership, the German 
multinational industrial group, Robert Bosch GmbH bought the company. 
Today, the managing director and most of the other managers are Danish, but 
there are a few German managers as well. A new production plant aimed at 
mass production has been built, and in addition, Bosch Telecom has invested 
considerable amounts in research and development. Since the German 
acquisition the number of employees in the Danish business unit of Bosch 
Telecom has increased from 750 to about 1650. In Denmark where most 
companies are small or medium-sized, this company has been the biggest in 
the region.  
However this company will now be divided into two units in near future. The 
R & D department with a staff of 300 higly qualified engineers and technicians 
has recently been acquired by the German multinational Siemens, whereas the 
production department with about 1200 employees will been taken over by the 
US company Flexotronics International Ltd. 
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Conceptual challenges  
In the following we will focus on the practical relevance of the social 
constructionist perspective for research on cultural change processes in 
mergers. We will take up three specific conceptual challenges: 
decontextualization of cultural issues, cultural differentiation and 
fragmentation, and systemic versus processual views on culture.4 And we will 
illustrate our points with examples from Gertsen and Soederberg’s empirical 
case study of the merging telecommunications company Dancall introduced 
above. 
 
From decontextualization to contextualization 
Cultural analyses frequently meet with problems of decontextualization. These 
have to do with the disconnecting of organizations from their environment. 
Analyses of organizational cultures often focus solely on internal factors and 
neglect the organizations' linkages to their environments. Still, there are a few 
exceptions which have concentrated on different national preferences or 
institutional practices (see e.g. Calori et al., 1994; Olie, 1994; Very et al., 
1997; Morosini, 1998; Gertsen & Soederberg, 1999).  
                                                 
4  These challenges reflect more general questions in cultural organization studies (see e.g. Alvesson & 
Berg, 1992; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992; Linstead & Grafton-Small, 1992; Martin, 1992; Hatch, 
1993; Trice & Beyer, 1993; Willmott, 1993; Harris, 1994; Schultz, 1994; Martin & Frost, 1996), but 
they are particularly central issues in research on post-merger cultural change processes. 
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The problem with decontextualization is that it prevents researchers and 
practitioners from contemplating how particular organizational cultures are 
embedded in, related to and sustained by their local and national surroundings. 
We suggest that studies in this field would benefit from conceptualizations that 
transcend organizational boundaries and seek the rationalities of particular 
practices in wider organizational networks or institutional systems. In this 
context, discussions concerning national business systems (see e.g. Whitley, 
1992; Whitley 1999) seem particularly interesting. At the local network level, 
it would be worthwhile to examine specific relations with for example 
suppliers, other local companies (e.g. partners in joint R&D projects), or local 
educational institutions.  
At the national institutional level, one might study for instance accounting 
procedures, education systems, or industrial relations (see Gertsen & 
Soederberg, 1999 for a further description of national differences in linkages to 
the organizational environment). In the case of the Danish electronics company 
Dancall, the acquiring British concern Amstrad was unaware of the well-
established position of trade unions in Danish society, and of the high degree 
of unionization among blue collar as well as white collar workers. In 
interviews the power of the trade unions and their role in relation to the 
company was explicitly mentioned by the British expatriate managers as one 
of the features that seemed to make managing in Denmark different from 
managing in Great Britain. The fact that in Denmark, not only workers, but 
also engineers, technicians, office staff, etc. are usually organized and that 
their unions make general wage agreements in collective bargaining, which 
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companies are obliged to comply with, was new to them. They soon had to 
realize that the demands of the Danish unions could not be ignored and that it 
was impossible to employ unorganized workers under different wage and 
working conditions than those contractually agreed upon. 
At the local network level there has been considerable cooperation between 
Dancall’s R&D department and a particular research center at a nearby 
university since company's start in 1981 (see Gertsen & Soederberg, 1999). 
The development of the first Danish GSM mobile phone took place in a 
science park connected to the university in 1990-92 as a joint project between 
this company and another local firm. Also, most of the engineers in the 
company are educated at the university and firmly believe that the company's 
success depends on intensive research activities. When the company was 
acquired by the British concern Amstrad, the new owners attempted to reduce 
all costs as much as possible. This resulted in cuts in the R&D budget, and the 
concern was unwilling to finance new joint development projects with the 
university or engage in explorative R&D projects which might not pay off on a 
short-term basis. The British owner of Amstrad and the expatriate managers 
felt an urgent need to produce short-term results. The development engineers 
were demotivated by this attitude from the British owner, who had no relevant 
technical knowledge in the field, but nevertheless personally interfered with 
planned projects in the R&D department and rejected them without any 
argument. Several engineers eventually chose to work with other companies 
where they found more challenging R&D projects.  
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Decontextualization has important implications for practitioners. A lack of 
attention to the environmental linkages of an organization's culture is 
misleading because it may cause an inability to understand the institutional 
roots and rationalities of particular practices. In many cases, decision-makers 
striving for savings or other synergistic benefits stemming from the 
standardization of particular practices have discovered that the required 
changes may not be worthwhile or even feasible because of linkages beyond 
organizational boundaries. 
In our view, a social constructionist approach makes the problems of 
decontextualization less likely to occur because of its emphasis on the 
organization's history and its embeddedness in a global and a local context as 
the basis of the organization's ongoing interaction with its surroundings. 
 
Recognition of cultural differentiation. 
Researchers have provided plenty of reflection on how organizations are 
subject to different types of cultural divisions (see e.g. Pettigrew, 1979; 
Gregory, 1983; Meyerson & Martin, 1987; Linstead & Grafton-Small, 1992; 
Martin, 1992). Martin (1992), for example, sees the differentiation perspective 
as complementary to the traditional, unitary integration view. She argues that 
the integration perspective can only provide information concerning views and 
values, which are commonly held within the entire organization. When such a 
perspective is used alone, it creates problems such as inability to reveal 
subcultures and multiplicity of views.  
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Although cultural differentiation are theoretically acknowledged, there is a 
strong tendency among empirically oriented researchers and practitioners to 
view organizational cultures as unitary belief systems (see Ogbonna & Harris, 
1998). In the merger context, this tendency has been particularly dominant as 
attention is focused on the integration of what is viewed as two separate 
cultures. Researchers in this field have not paid much attention to the fact that 
the organizational cultures of the merging organizations are not likely to be 
completely homogenous, internally consistent or unambiguous. The problem is 
that the integration perspective may be a misleading starting point, especially 
in the context of large multinational organizations, consisting of several types 
of units and operating in several countries. 
In a merger context, the division between the two formerly separate 
organizations is central, but it is not the only one on which the actors' cultural 
interpretation may focus. Another obvious but often not explicitly recognized 
division is that between the management in charge and the employees making 
up the organizations in questions. As discussed in a previous example, there 
are also professional divisions that are likely to be relevant. Similarly, for 
example, gender or ethnic considerations might play a role in these processes. 
In the Dancall case, when the company was acquired by the British concern 
Amstrad after financial problems and suspension of payments, different groups 
of employees had completely different perspectives on the merger (see Gertsen 
& Soederberg, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). The unskilled workers were much more 
dependent on the British concern than the engineers in the development 
department, for instance. Alternative employment opportunities for unskilled 
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workers in the local area were extremely limited. That is why they would go to 
great lengths to accept less favorable wage and working conditions. They were 
also very sensitive to the management's argument that savings were necessary 
to ensure the survival of the Danish company (that is to say, their jobs) and 
readily accepted Amstrad's policies regarding strict financial control and cost 
reduction in various areas. Their overall attitude to Amstrad was very positive, 
and they seemed to identify with the company's new owners and managers. 
The development engineers' situation was quite different. They were well 
aware of their own worth in the labor market, and they knew that it was their 
know-how in GSM technology which the British concern found attractive in 
order to get onto the global market for cellular telephones. Therefore, the 
engineers did not accept any reduction in their wages or any deterioration in 
their working conditions. They were also very critical about any attempt by the 
management to reduce the engineers’ autonomy in work, and about their strict 
financial control of purchases to the R&D department. They felt that such 
initiatives demonstrated the new management's lack of understanding for R&D 
in advanced technologies. But the British concern was also aware of the 
strategic importance of the engineer group for the future of the company. So 
the management preferred to comply with most of the engineers’ demands 
rather than to create conflicts. Contrary to other employee groups, the 
engineers retained more or less the same salary and working conditions as 
before the company suspended payments. Still, though the engineers expressed 
commitment to their development projects, they did not in any way seem to 
identify with the British concern. 
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This case shows that it can be problematic to assume that a company has a 
homogeneous, stable and coherent organizational culture. The Danish 
company obviously consists of a number of partially intersecting subcultures. 
If we look at engineers and unskilled workers, we find that they had very little 
in common, either as regards their interests or the way they perceived the 
company and interpreted the foreign management's initiatives. They also had 
only limited personal contact with each other; they worked in different 
buildings, and very little communication took place between them. Therefore, 
the differentiation perspective (Martin, 1992) offers a multifaceted picture of 
the post-merger situation. This perspective recognizes the existence of a 
number of small cultural communities associated with different departments 
and professions in the company.  
The point to be made here is that cultural change processes may be very 
differently perceived in different parts of the merging organizations and among 
different sub-groups of people. An integration perspective on culture may hide 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the organizational cultures, which may 
actually be important and should not just be seen as anomalies to be discarded. 
Also, it should not be overlooked that a group may perceive its own (sub-) 
cultural identity as more coherent than before when it is confronted with or 
feels threatened by that of another group. And, obviously, this may well be 
exactly what happens in connection with a merger (cf. the social 
constructionist view of culture as relational). 
 
From systemic to processual views on culture 
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Cultural studies of mergers typically focus on initially perceived cultural 
differences conceptualized in terms of value systems which are assumed to 
guide behavior. These studies usually pay little attention to the (often slow) 
processes of cultural change during the post-merger phases. Significant 
attention has been given to issues such as "culture fit" and "cultural distance" 
(see Cartwright & Cooper, 1992, 1993; Olie, 1994; Weber et al., 1996). These 
studies use a priori measured or estimated cultural differences as explanations 
for and predictors of organizational problems. There are plenty of examples of 
studies concentrating on decision-makers' beliefs and values (e.g. Chatterjee et 
al., 1992) or national cultural differences (see e.g. Very et al., 1998). This type 
of thinking has also been prevalent in the business press. However, some 
researchers have concluded that the predictive value of estimates or 
measurements of cultural differences at national and organizational levels 
remains questionable (see e.g. Gertsen & Soederberg, 1998b).  
A social constructionist approach to the role of culture in mergers implies that 
the researcher does not have the ambition to develop universalist theories or 
make analyses whose results can be applied in the form of general guidelines 
for managers. This is because the ongoing social construction of culture is seen 
as a process which is dynamic in its nature and depends on an almost infinite 
variety of individual and contextual factors, some of them unforeseeable for or 
inaccessible to the researcher. So unlike most research in the business field, 
this approach is neither normative, nor prognostic, but has the advantage of 
highlighting more aspects of managerial reality and offering situated, practical 
knowledge (see Kleppestø, 1993, 1998; Gertsen & Soederberg, 1998).  
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In the Dancall case, a "pre-merger culture analysis" was actually carried out in 
practice. This took place when the German concern Bosch bought the Danish 
company from British Amstrad in 1997. Bosch had recently experienced a 
couple of disastrous foreign take-overs, and its management thought that more 
attention to cultural issues might make the integration phase more painless this 
time. Therefore, Bosch's executive intercultural training unit carried out a 
comparative cultural analysis in order to identify differences between the 
Danish Dancall and the German Bosch - including both national and 
organizational dimensions. The idea was that in this way, managers would 
know more about what to expect from each other beforehand, and this would 
supposedly make communication easier. The analysis was based on a limited 
number of interviews with key actors in Germany and Denmark and resulted in 
two lists characterizing the two companies/countries: In brief, the Danish 
company culture was claimed to be easy-going, fast, people-oriented, and 
flexible. Bosch's culture, on the other hand, was described as formal, 
authoritarian, power-oriented, and bureaucratic. 
The fact that Bosch had actually taken the initiative to such an analysis was 
initially interpreted as a good sign by the Danes. This was seen as an indication 
that their culture would be respected, especially since Dancall seemed to be 
described in such a positive way in comparison to Bosch. But the analysis also 
activated some of the common Danish stereotypes about Germans and thereby 
provided the Danes with ready explanations as soon as the need for mutual 
adaptation began to be felt. The focus on Germans as formal, authoritarian 
bureaucrats - and the negative emotions this idea may provoke - maybe 
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diverted the Danish employees' attention from the actual common problems to 
be solved: major issues such as strategic planning and minor issues in 
connection with reporting procedures. Eventually, the Danish managers came 
to refer to the culture analysis and its description of Bosch whenever 
disagreements appeared. Though they had expected that Bosch would pay due 
regard to their culture, they soon began to think that this was not sufficiently 
the case, and many consequently felt the report to have been a false signal that 
turned into a disappointment. All in all, it does not seem likely that the "pre-
merger culture analysis" furthered integration in this case, more likely the 
opposite. But the report - or rather, the ways in which it was interpreted - did 
seem to have an effect, though probably not the one Bosch's management had 
hoped for. Two years after the acquisition, the Danish R&D manager described 
it as follows: "It was worthless. It simply confirmed people's prejudices. It 
would have been better to spend some time trying to look through these 
prejudices, to get rid of appearances, and come down to what it takes to work 
together".   
The dominant essentialist perspective on culture implies a lack of attention to 
the processes of change where cultures are transformed and developed. We 
suggest that a key to understanding long-term cultural integration processes is 
the recognition that a merger creates new cultural identifications and 
communities. To organizational decision-makers, it is crucial to pay attention 
to this ongoing social construction of organizational identities and cultures. By 
focusing on the creation of new cultures instead of conflicts between old ones, 
it may be possible to overcome unproductive debates concerning the choice 
  27 
 
between for instance existing cultural symbols or practices originated in one of 
the two companies.  
The actors’ cultural interpretation processes should be seen as firmly linked 
with their identification and identity construction processes. Cultural identities 
are developed by distinguishing oneself from another group and emphasizing 
the cultural differences that appear important. Reduction of uncertainty, 
reduction of ambiguity, construction of similarities and differences, boundary 
drawing, and (re)construction of stereotypes are likely to be essential in these 
processes. 
Especially in merger situations, where there is often considerable 
organizational upheaval and anxiety, there is likely to be uncertainty 
concerning the near and distant future at organizational,  and individual levels. 
In these situations, cultural categorizations may serve the purpose of reducing 
this uncertainty by providing cognitive means to handle the situation. This 
reduction of uncertainty may first lead to relatively superficial categories, 
which may then later become more refined understandings. When relatively 
short time has been spent with the other side, actors are likely to make use of 
existing stereotypes about themselves and others. This is especially likely to be 
the case in international mergers and acquisitions. As researchers have pointed 
out, national stereotypes typically function as a first pattern of interpretation, 
before more refined understandings are developed (cf. Gertsen & Soederberg, 
1998b). 
From a social constructionist viewpoint it may be argued that it is these 
identification processes that lead to the cultural conceptions rather than vice 
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versa (cf. Kleppestø, 1993). Positive experiences tend to make actors perceive 
and describe cultural differences as small or predominantly valuable. In case of 
failure, cultural differences are often described as considerable and 
problematic, and are pointed out as causes of difficulties (Vaara, 1998). If 
there is a negative feeling towards the foreign company, for example because 
of financial difficulties and ensuing fear of cutbacks and organizational 
changes, or as a result of a power struggle, it is likely that the employees in the 
acquired company will feel a need to emphasize that their culture is different 
and better, and the work style and the managerial attitudes in the acquiring 
company lead to cooperation difficulties. If, conversely, the merger or 
acquisition leads to financial success and better career opportunities or greater 
security of employment, the employees will be more inclined to describe the 
differences experienced in positive terms ("something we can learn from"). Or 
they will treat them as a funny, but harmless characteristic, to which one can 
adapt.  
The majority of managerially oriented cultural studies tend to treat cultural 
differences as problems and barriers, not as sources of learning. This is also the 
case in the merger context where most researchers adopting a cultural 
perspective on post-merger change processes assume that cultural differences 
are causes of post-merger problems. We would like to emphasize that 
perceived cultural differences can also be assets that benefit organizations (see 
e.g. Krishnan et al., 1997). In the merger setting, this means that the different 
national or organizational cultures are potential sources of complementary 
experience (see e.g. Krishnan et al., 1997; Morosini, 1998; Morosini et al., 
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1998), capability transfer (see e.g. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), and learning 
(see e.g. Villinger, 1996; Leroy & Ramanantsoa, 1997). The internal 
discussions and comparisons following mergers can also serve a constructive 
purpose by forcing people to reflect on their own practices. This may in turn 
lead to changes and improvements in these practices. This was the case in 
Dancall, where Danish middle managers admit that they learnt very much 
about assertiveness and competitive behavior from the British CEO who was 
sent to Denmark to manage the company as a business unit in the Amstrad 
concern. Even though the Danish development engineers had a very high 
reputation as specialists within GSM-technology, they never thought of 
ambitious mission statements like the following formulated by the British 
CEO: "We want our company to become one of the four world giants within 
cellular communication." The Danish managers and development engineers 
who were primarily committed to the ongoing research and development 
processes learned a great deal from the British CEO’s strong market 
orientation. The expatriate British CEO introduced a remarkable shift of focus 
by taking initiatives to get long-term contracts and financial support from 
operators at the global telecommunications market before initiating new 
research and development projects.  
After the company has now, some years later, been acquired by the German 
multinational Bosch, the Danish managers and employees have experienced 
that new control procedures ensure that performance comes close to plan and 
that corrective action is taken. In this area the Danish managers have observed 
a management style very different from the one they had been accustomed to. 
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Especially when it comes to what the Danes characterize as "micro-
management", the routines were not so elaborated in the Danish company. 
These perceived differences between organizational practices led to minor 
conflicts when for example the German sales people were more concerned 
with questions why for example the sales target for Poland was not fulfilled, 
whereas the Danes were enthusiastic because instead, the sales in Roumania 
were four times bigger than expected, and thus more than compensated the bad 
result in Poland. As the Danish director of finance stated in an interview, the 
Danish company had realized that it would have to learn from the bigger 
company’s professionalism and orient itself more to rules and routines, 
especially in planning and mass production. But simultaneously the Danes 
wanted to maintain some of the qualities of what they perceived as their 
company culture, a more spontaneous approach to problem solving and an 
innovative team spirit, something that they wanted the German managers and 
employees to learn from them. 
 
An agenda for future research  
The previous sections discussed major conceptual challenges in research on 
post-merger cultural change processes and highlighted the shortcomings of the 
dominant cultural paradigm in merger research. One way to solve these 
difficulties may be to drop the culture concept altogether. This would, 
however, have the drawback that valuable insights in the actors' experiences 
might be lost. It would also imply that researchers would distance themselves 
from the practical world of business and management where the "culture 
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discourse" is an inherent part of the public debate on mergers. Therefore, we 
find it worthwhile to consider how specific social constructionist alternatives 
may be developed in order to study cultural change processes in mergers. 
Social constructionism is sometimes perceived as a theoretical approach totally 
devoted to postmodern scepticism, critique and deconstruction. And indeed, it 
does unsettle the assumptions of the dominant scientific paradigm as regards 
the rationality of human beings, objective knowledge and scientific truth (see 
e.g. Czarniawska, 1999). Some sceptical readers will possibly be disappointed 
and claim that they are left without any concrete guidelines, just with a sense 
that everything is relative, ambiguous, context-bound, and ever changing. But 
critique also gives way to emancipation, and social constructionism opens up 
for alternative visions of knowledge production and for new practices engaging 
researchers and practitioners in dialogue. 
A social constructionist approach also offers new ways of exploring 
organizational life. We suggest that future studies on cultural change processes 
in a merger context focus on cultural sensemaking processes. More 
specifically, we advocate studies of narratives of organizational change 
processes told by different actors in the merging organizations. Furthermore, 
we recommend studies of how managers and employees construct new visions 
for the future (se for example Gertsen & Soederberg, 2000)  
 
Cultural sensemaking processes 
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Studies on cultural change processes in merging organizations might well draw 
from studies on sensemaking processes (Sackmann, 1991; Weick, 1995). The 
concept of "sensemaking" has been given different definitions in studies on 
organizational actors' interpretation processes (see e.g. Dutton & Jackson, 
1987; Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Gioia 
& Chittipeddi, 1991; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992; Weick, 1995; Gioia & 
Thomas, 1996; Vaara, 1999). With support in Weick (1995), we will 
understand "sensemaking" as an ongoing process that is grounded in shifting 
identity constructions. It is retrospective, that is, when many possible meanings 
may need to be synthesized, the clarification is often worked out in reverse. 
Sensemaking is enactive of the organizational environments: Organizational 
actors produce part of their environment while doing things with words and 
creating the materials that become the constraints and opportunities of this 
environment. Sensemaking is moreover a social process taking place within a 
community that is viewed as a network of intersubjectively shared meanings 
sustained through the development and use of a common language and 
everyday social interaction. Thus, studies on actors’ cultural sensemaking 
processes should focus on collective negotiations and discussions.  
Such construction of shared understandings is necessary to provide a basis for 
meaningful social action in organizations. This should not be understood as a 
requirement for organization-wide long-term consensus but rather for 
continuous renegotiation of particular arrangements and search for a common 
basis for action. It is, in fact, important to see that specific meaning(s) given to 
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organizational structures may be different for different actors in different 
settings.  
From a cognitive perspective, sensemaking processes can be seen as processes 
through which collective discussions lead to the formation of specific 
cognitive maps. Especially interesting are organizational learning processes 
where actors continuously try to make sense of the perceived cultural 
characteristics of both sides and of the cooperation involved. Mergers also 
trigger emotional processes among the actors. The organizational changes may 
appear positive or negative from the perspective of the organizational 
members. Positive changes are likely to lead to sensemaking processes that 
portray the merger as favorable. If the organizational changes are seen as 
negative, for example if “good old” procedures and routines are changed 
leaving the actors with a feeling of being threatened, challenged, and made 
insecure about their future tasks, they will tend to emphasize problematic 
features of the merger. What is important is not only whether the total gains 
are positive or negative when added up, but also whether the effects, positive 
or negative, are perceived by the organizational actors as distributed in an 
equal and fair manner. Thus, a merger that all in all benefits both sides, may 
still be interpreted in a negative manner by those who feel that they have 
suffered injustice and that the psychological contract of equality has been 
broken. Such an emotional experience of injustice may be turned into a general 
conception of lack of synergy and into organizational problems in cooperation.  
Sensemaking processes can also be seen as political processes, that is: as 
purposeful manipulation and use of meanings for the promotion of 
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organizational or personal interests. The point to be made is twofold: On the 
one hand, the actors’ interests are in themselves socially constructed as part of 
the complex identification processes in organizations. On the other hand, and 
more interestingly, these actors also purposefully influence the collective 
sensemaking processes by intentional "management of meaning". The clearest 
manifestation of this is probably management's work to justify the merger 
decision, to seek social acceptance for their plans, and to motivate people to 
work for the new joint organization. In fact, a crucial part of their leadership 
role is precisely this management of the organizational change processes at the 
symbolic level. Other organizational actors, however, are also likely to 
promote different or conflicting agendas to further their own careers or other 
interests by attaching alternative meanings to the issues discussed. 
Finally, sensemaking processes may be seen as institutionalization processes. 
From this perspective, institutionalization of the new post-merger 
organizational structure and its associated practices requires construction of 
commonly shared meanings. When the actors have reached a certain consensus 
and new meanings begin to be taken for granted as elements of organizational 
life, there is no longer a strong need for deliberate collective sensemaking: a 
new culture has arisen. This, however, does not imply the end of sensemaking 
activity. Sensemaking processes are ongoing activities and in all organisations, 
new emerging issues have to be dealt with on a continuous basis. 
 
Narratives of organizational change 
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Narratives play an important role in organizational sensemaking processes. 
Therefore we suggest that future studies on post-merger cultural change 
processes draw from theories and methods of narrative analysis (see e.g. 
Bruner, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1987; Greimas, 1991, Czarniawska, 1997). The 
value of the narrative perspective on cultural change processes is that it 
provides tools for the analysis of stories and myths spread around the 
organizations and told by different organizational actors in different settings 
and at different points of time. The strength of such studies clearly relies upon 
the researchers’ ability to gather or get access to an extensive qualitative 
material to focus on specific structural or thematic features of these stories. 
A narratological approach helps to understand the discursive framework used 
by story-tellers to make sense of different actions and events. For example how 
national and organizational culture issues are used in a plot to account for 
success or failures.  
Narratological analysis focuses on different elements in the narrative 
constructions. A narrative must have a goal or a project. Events relevant to the 
endpoint must be explained, such as for example a company’s suspension of 
all payments and a foreign take over of a company. The story may also be 
focused on a state to be reached, for example the corporate vision that the 
company becomes a “global player” in its industry. Or it may focus on a state 
to be avoided, for example that the best R&D engineers leave the merged 
company because they are offered better job conditions by the competing 
companies. Organizational events and individual actions are related and 
ordered in the narrative in a sequence of time. Narratives also provide a sense 
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of explanation through more or less explicit causal linkages. For example, the 
new British CEO told us after Amstrad's acquisition of Dancall that "The 
company had to suspend its payments because the former management was not 
able to maintain strict financial control, and because it delegated too much 
responsibility to middle management and aimed at consensus. I, on the other 
hand, tend to…"  
We have observed in our empirical studies (Vaara, 1998; Gertsen & 
Soederberg, 2000) that in turbulent and challenging situations, which often 
occur in a merger, most organizational actors, and especially the managers, 
feel a need to tell their stories. These may be accounts for what they have 
already done (to justify it to themselves and others), what they are doing right 
now (to monitor/control it, at least in their minds), and what they will do in the 
future (to plan it) (see also Czarniawska, 1997). These accounts are usually 
communicated in a narrative mode as the actors try to endow with meaning 
what they do and what has happened to them in the organization. The narrators 
generally reveal very different perceptions of their own role and those of the 
others in the course of events.  
In our case of the Danish company acquired by a British and later by a German 
industrial group, it was evident that different voices told of the same events in 
different ways and that the same voices told differently about the same events 
at different times (Gertsen & Soederberg, 2000). The shop stewart, for 
example, who was extremely relieved that her and her colleagues' jobs have 
been secured, said of the British acquisition: "They saved us, didn't they? If 
Amstrad hadn't bought Dancall, we'd still be out of work." The R&D manager 
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was much more guarded in his comments: "The acquisition has been a good 
thing in many ways, but their [Amstrad's] understanding of GSM technology is 
still insufficient. I suppose they'll learn, but if not, I'll look for another job - as 
I see it, what I do must be fun and technologically challenging."  
The narratological perspective applied to the interviews analysed offers insight 
into interpretations based on different perspectives, and at the same time 
displays how central actors within an acquired company may have very 
different goals and world views. The narratological analyses also make it clear 
how different organizational narrators and actors construct different plots and 
account for causalities from different points of view. The analyses demonstrate 
that the plots and causalities in the narratives told must be seen as a result of 
both individual and collective processes of selection, hierarchization and 
sequencing of organizational actions and events. The narratological analyses 
also focus on different modes of storytelling. Gertsen & Soederberg (2000) 
have analysed both rationalistic, seemingly objective accounts and enthusiastic 
stories about individuals' visions and future plans for the company, and tales of 
personal triumph and managerial success. But they have also analysed tales of 
trial and failure told by both top management and people lower in the 
workplace hierarchy who blame problems on others’ actions or present cultural 
differences at a national or an organizational level as the explanation of failed 
plans. 
The longitudinal perspective on the organizational change perspectives in the 
Dancall case made it clear how narrators’ stories change and develop over 
time. Stories told over the years - from the suspension of payments in 1993 
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through British and German mergers of the company - show for instance that 
the dominant merger partner seems to move from a position as a "helper" to a 
position as an "opponent" or a cause of problems as soon as some time has 
passed or a new company is taking over. When the one of the managers was 
interviewed just after Bosch had bought the company from Amstrad, he 
described the new owner as a helper: "We had a lot of problems during 
Amstrad's ownership. But now, with the help of Bosch's brand name and 
capital, I believe we're able to become a much stronger player in the global 
telecommunications market." But a year later, when targets had not been met, 
he said: "Bosch is definitely not a world champion in telecommunications – 
that’s why we have problems. They do not understand that this technology 
requires huge investments. As I see it, Bosch has three possibilities: Closing us 
down, investing billions in marketing, factories, and development, or they can 
find someone for us to collaborate with... Of course we won't be sold, but... We 
won't be able to make it alone."  
Both top and middle managers tend to see themselves as decisive agents when 
the company experiences success. But they tend to downplay the impact of 
their own decisions when problems arise. In times of trial, managers typically 
point to contextual factors outside their control as causes of problems - the 
merger partner, the market, the competitors, the technological development 
and consumers' changing preferences. Other organizational actors - for 
instance the shop steward, the production workers and the secretaries - 
represent themselves as agents to a much lesser extent, regardless of whether 
things go well or not. 
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Along the same lines, in a study of managers’ narratives of post-merger 
integration in Finnish-Swedish cases, Vaara (1998) found that retrospective 
accounts showed a very clear tendency to attribute failure to cultural 
differences. Thus, when decision-makers told stories of frustration, they tended 
to rely on a "cultural" rhetoric implying that differences between the 
previously separate organizational and national sides were referred to often 
and in a negative manner. But when the decision-makers described successful 
developments, they preferred a "rationalistic" rhetoric, emphasizing for 
instance strategic or financial considerations. 
Thus, managers are more than ready to take responsibility when things go well, 
but they are quick to identify reasons and adversaries in the environment when 
problems arise. In this way, managers' accounts may distort researchers' 
conclusions if such tendencies in managers’ story-telling are not detected in 
studies of factors that lead to success or failure in mergers or acquisitions. This 
is particularly problematic if scholars put forward very specific practical 
guidelines for managers based on such potentially misleading information. 
Therefore, it is probably wise to interpret causal explanations with a grain of 
salt when relying on qualitative interviews. A narratological perspective on 
interviews can make it clear that the truth of the managers’ and employees’ 
stories may not lie in the "facts" they recount, but rather in the way they 
construct their story and retrospectively try to make sense of a course of 
actions and events. 
It has been mentioned earlier that dramatic organizational changes such as 
mergers and acquisitions can create a sense of helplessness and confusion 
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among the employees, or a feeling of being threatened by the unknown future. 
In that case, narratives may be helpful when constructed deliberately to bring 
people within the merging companies a sense of belonging to a new cultural 
community from which a new future may spring (see Gergen, 1999). But of 
course there is always a risk that so-called shared narratives are introduced by 
top management with no basis in feelings shared by other employees in the 
merging companies. This is fairly often the case - an example is given by 
Gertsen & Soederberg (1998b) where new US managers from a dominant 
merger partner announce to their somewhat sceptical Danish partner what are 
to be their shared values as soon as the merger is made public. Still, it might 
well be possible to find stories telling of positive experiences across 
boundaries and spread them to build a common ground among people in the 
merging organizations. Such stories of joint successes obtained by for example 
a merged group of R&D engineers or the merged sales and marketing staff 
might be used in the creation of new visions for a viable future together and 
perhaps even contribute to a set of action programs for future collaboration.  
 
Concluding remarks 
We have argued that the literature on cultural dimensions of mergers is 
dominated by an essentialist conception of culture. We have elaborated here on 
an alternative social constructionist perspective on organizations and cultures. 
This perspective is theoretically founded, and we believe that research on 
mergers can benefit greatly from it. It would reduce the risk of arriving at 
conclusions and possibly recommendations to managers that may be 
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misleading because of insufficient attention paid to contexts, cultural 
differentiation or fragmentation, or ongoing cultural change processes. 
To managers, likewise, social constructionism may provide new insights, offer 
new analytical tools, and contribute to the creation of new strategies and 
visions for the future. The emphasis on contingency and embeddedness makes 
it less likely that practitioners overlook relevant local linkages and the impact 
of national business systems on merger performance. An enhanced 
understanding of culture as a dynamic process encompassing differentiation, 
fragmentation and ambiguities leads to more multifaceted pictures of daily life 
in merged organizations. And an awareness that our understandings of events 
and actions are socially constructed may help both managers and employees to 
shift their perspectives and see organizational life from others' perspectives. As 
the organizational scholar Gareth Morgan puts it in his book Imaginization. 
New Mindsets for Seeing, Organizing, and Managing (1993), the effective 
manager must be able to imagine multiple realities and put them into use as he 
or she negotiates the world with others. And this is exactly what social 
constructionism can assist him or her in doing.  
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